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In 1974 the World Bank published a prominent study: “Redistribution with Growth”. It set 
out thinking about achieving the Holy Grail of development economics – how to obtain over-
all growth and a better life for all at the same time.  
The developmental discourse faces two issues. Why would powerful people heed the call of 
technocrats for policy reform when it does not explicitly aim at assuring that they come out 
well? Not only that, but standard developmental discourse has recently emphasized that cor-
ruption is a scourge that prevents countries from growing. If this type of enrichment of the 
powerful may actually be at odds with technocratic policy advice, why follow the advice?  
Many  people  actually  running  bits  of  the  world  want  power  and  wealth.  The  spectacular 
growth performance of many countries across the globe has shown that traditional ways of 
ruling and robbing a country may not be very effective at reaching those goals. How then can 
enrichment best be pursued by powerful elites? 
One might call the goal of the greedy ruler “Enrichment with Growth”. In the following I set 
out arguments that a Consigliere to the “rich and shameless” might want to think about. First, 
I discuss key mechanisms that characterize “traditional” corruption. Second, I set out an ap-
proach to enrichment that nowadays seems to be followed by many autocrats – ownership of 
professionally managed corporations – and its limitations. Third, arguments are provided for a 
potentially more promising approach to enrichment, one that looks suspiciously like some 
forms of industrial policy. Fourth, the most effective form of enrichment is described – run-
ning an economy like a portfolio manager with decent corporate governance. Finally, the pa-
per concludes with perspectives on the debate about enrichment of powerful people, growth 
and legitimacy. 
 
Extracting Rents and Effects on Economic Performance  
Corruption is supposed to make the corrupt better off. In doing so it may undermine the wel-
fare of others, not just to the degree of direct stealing, but by destroying the very basis for 
economic activity. It is, for example, utterly clear that systems of what Mancur Olson called 
“roving bandits” fail (Olson, 2000). Competing rent-extracting “warlords” destroy the basis 
for wealth and end up with little wealth themselves compared to what can be obtained in well-
functioning countries (see Shleifer and Vishny (1993) for a basic model).  
The warlords themselves are typically not terribly rich by the standards of today’s world and 
they are somewhat limited in enjoying the fruit of their stealing. They might be interested in 
developing the economy, if they can benefit in the bargain. Even in less dysfunctional systems 
corrupt elites see what is apparently possible in today’s world. Countries like China and India 
are still plagued by corruption; yet they grow extremely fast. The ideal for the corrupt would 
                                                 
1 I am indebted to Alexander Libman and Ignacio Mas for helpful comments    Enrichment with Growth 
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be to support general economic growth in a way that allows them to make more in absolute 
terms. 
The basic arithmetic is simple. Assume you want to make money off extracting wealth from a 
country. In a country with the income level of the Democratic Republic of Congo you need to 
extract 100 per cent of GDP to obtain the same amount of money that extracting just 1 per 
cent in a country like Korea gives you (assuming equal populations). In Tunisia one would 
need to collect 5 per cent and in Nigeria 15 per cent of GDP for the purpose. All this simply 
reflects the level of income per person in the countries. 
Economic analysis has at times suggested that corruption drags down growth (see Mauro, 
1995 for an initial empirical study). Yet, the progress of analysis has left us with the finding 
that it is hard to tell how corruption affects growth (Svensson, 2005). In particular, it is by no 
means clear that all forms of corruption are inimical to growth. There is thus hope for corrupt 
autocrats to find ways to enrich themselves even more by modernizing at the same time. 
The following discussion explores basic features of policies that may  make this possible. 
First,  consider  how  the  mechanisms  corruptly  to  extract  rents  often  undermine  economic 
growth. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that one feature of corruption that leads to pervasi-
ve ill-effects is the need for secrecy. Corruptors would thus tend to favor projects where cor-
ruption can be easily hidden, but which may not be efficient. Second, corruptors would want 
to enhance the ability to extract rents and to keep others out of the corruption racket. Hence 
they would act against new entry and thus undermine innovation in an economy. In the follo-
wing I explore this line of thought further. In doing so I use a number of anecdotes derived 
from my work in Nigeria in the 1980s and early 1990s
2.  
Let’s start by considering the “business model” of the corrupt. Those who wish to enrich 
themselves need to solve several problems. They need to find partners - partners to obtain 
favors from and partners to collaborate with to obtain such favors. They then need to monitor 
whether the partners stick to their commitments and enforce the commitments. They need to 
do this largely without the help of formal institutions such as contracts or courts.  
Finding partners 
Somehow the corrupt partners must find each other. To some degree the formal power struc-
tures in a government or corporation simplify the match-making. It is usually well-known 
which formal positions go hand in hand with the ability to dispense favors and punish defecti-
on. Still, it is not always clear whether all people in position of power are corrupt. Also, 
match-making cannot always be done in straight-forward ways for at least residual risk of 
prosecution, although this varies, of course, with the degree of control corrupt parties have 
over formal institutions such as the police or judges.  
                                                 
2 Intriguingly Nigeria has improved in recent years. Growth accelerated, particularly that of the non-oil econo-
my, which virtually stagnated during the oil booms of the seventies and early eighties. Aggregate perception 
indicators suggest that among countries with some of the worst reputation for corruption Nigeria has made ex-
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Here it can help to create and maintain a general atmosphere of corruption. Paradoxically, 
even a somewhat vocal press can help make the point that corruption is widespread. As long 
as the allegations are not too specific, sometimes outlandish and not verifiable in a court of 
law this may help prepare the terrain by biasing the people interested in doing business in the 
country in question to those willing to be corrupt. To some degree, therefore, public accusati-
ons of corruption may in fact facilitate the establishment of corrupt business relations. Nige-
ria’s rambunctious somewhat uncontrollable press may just have played this role. Accusations 
of corruption abound, yet little is done and many accusations may just be fabrications – a stra-
tegy of disinformation. Where everybody expects corruption, many will choose to play the 
game. Thus expectations are validated. 
That leaves the issue of identifying specific individuals with whom to enter into corrupt rela-
tions. Some form of ostentatious wealth relative to the rest of society, like an expensive house 
or car, may help signal that a particular individual might be corrupt. At the same time the le-
vel of ostentatiousness needs to be calibrated such that it might just plausibly be due to legi-
timate sources of income such as true business success or pre-existing family wealth
3. 
Such signals pave the way to conversations that can establish willingness “to deal”. As in the 
case of gangsters who seek partners (Gambetta, 2009), it is not straightforward to establish 
relations of trust. There need to be places where potential partners can meet for legitimate 
reasons and where they can gauge each other’s dispositions. The assessment of whether to 
trust someone to be willing to commit an illegal act tends to be a drawn-out process, as poten-
tial partners observe a host of subtle clues about each other, before broaching the true deal 
directly. A typical setting for meeting and assessing potential partners would be at the private 
residence of important intermediaries, where streams of visitors of all types from official a-
gencies, politics or businesses come and go throughout the day. The setting is relaxed; no ob-
vious agenda is visible other than a friendly visit. Chance conversations are possible – an ide-
al place to meet and subtly explore. 
Before a deal can be done between the principals in a corrupt transaction, they might use in-
termediaries to prepare the terrain. Intermediaries are matchmakers. They know corrupt peo-
ple. They may have long-lasting relationships with multiple parties on both sides and are thus 
able to build trust. In some contexts their contacts and relationships may even allow them to 
be more stable partners than changing top policymakers or changing CEOs. (Think “Klaus 
Schwab” and “World Economic Forum” for a legitimate variant of matchmaking). The use of 
intermediaries also allows the principal some plausible deniability till the final deal is closed. 
They  might  get  their  income  from  fees  that  can  look  legitimate  –  the  “consulting  fee”  - 
without actually participating directly in grand corruption. In fact, intermediaries may com-
mand extra trust, if they stick to their normal “fee schedule” and clearly stay away from 
asking for a special cut in deals. 
                                                 
3 There is a corruption joke that goes as follows: The minister of public works in country x visits counterparty in 
country y. He gets invited to the sumptuous private home with pools, gardens, tennis courts etc. Asks: how 
can you afford this on your official salary? Answer by minister from y: “see that road over there?” – minister 
from x says: “yes!” - minister from y says: “15%!” The year after minister of y gets invited to minister in 
country x. Visits private home of counterpart – even more grandiose and full of fancy cars. Asks: How can 
you afford this? Answer: “see that road over there?” – “no!” – “see, 100%!” The joke is funny, because stea-
ling 100% would mean an action beyond plausible deniability and without a “developmental” smokescreen.   Enrichment with Growth 
 
 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
  7 
 
Deal clinching meetings follow. In one case, the CEO of an engineering company sought to 
meet the managing director of a large public enterprise. After long periods of petitioning for a 
meeting and waiting, he finally was ushered into the office of the managing director, who sat 
in his chair behind the desk and faced the wall. For four hours he remained in silence while 
the radio played. Then he turned. A deal was closed in the ensuing meeting
4. At first sight 
such behavior is bizarre. Yet, “waiting games” may serve two functions. They select people 
who are interested to wait and thus seem sufficiently desperate for a deal. Silence also serves 
to place pressure on the waiting party to show his hand, possibly by offering a “good deal”, 
thereby revealing willingness to enter into corrupt relations. At the same time offering to 
make corrupt payments provides a form of compromising evidence that exposes the briber
5. 
The complex process of match-making explains some prima facie “weird” behavior. It also 
means that it takes time. The only study I am aware of about the actual transaction costs (exc-
luding  technical  or  legal  studies)  of  making  deals  for  large  private  infrastructure  projects 
shows these costs can be substantial. Accordingly, normal transaction costs tend to amount to 
some 3 per cent of project cost, whereas in complicated environments these costs can go often 
to 10 per cent or more (Klein, So and Shin 1996). The extra costs are essentially due to time 
wasted by highly paid lawyers or contractors waiting for meetings, not extra costs of writing 
complex contracts. It is normal to argue that the time spent so inefficiently demonstrates the 
low capacity of some governments or their disorganization and lack of political direction. In 
fact, it may be that the same observable phenomena reflect rational strategies to explore the 
potential for corrupt transactions.  
Managing corrupt relationships 
The costs of establishing corrupt relationships militate against expanding them too much. Mo-
reover, keeping the number of parties to a corrupt relationship limited helps managing it. Fe-
wer people may be more easily monitored and they present fewer chances for whistleblowing. 
In addition, it is helpful, if it is always the same few people so that repeated interaction can 
limit the incentives to renege on agreements. Importantly, the group of participants has an 
incentive to obtain and maintain incriminating information on the others to be able to retaliate 
should one renege. Providing such information to each other voluntarily is actually helpful for 
cementing cohesion.  
Loyalty is important so that whistleblowing and reneging is unlikely. Hence the use of family 
members in corruption rackets or members of the same ethnic group. If those participating in 
corruption rackets are not very competent at doing anything but being corrupt, loyalty can be 
further enhanced. Those who have no promising alternative employment have lessened incen-
tives to be disloyal.  
Corruption becomes detrimental when multiple parties ratchet up bribe demands for comple-
mentary services they provide such as protection from the police together with a license for 
construction or when multiple “police forces” all ask for protection money without being able 
                                                 
4 I have no evidence that corrupt payments played a role. Yet, the behavior would just be bizarre, if it was not at 
least an attempt to assess the readiness to be corrupt. 
5 The typical strategy to elicit bribes in the Hotel I used to stay in in Lagos would be to let arriving visitors wait 




Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 172 
 
to ensure protection from the competing police. In this case, rent-seeking will erode gains 
from corruption. Hence it is rational to maintain de facto “fee schedules” of who needs to be 
paid and with how much. It is also necessary to keep new entrants out and to arbitrate disputes 
should they occur. 
Allocation of funds and arbitration may be easiest, where sources of corruption (“spigots” – 
for example, rents from oil, gas and mining operations) can clearly be allocated to as few par-
ties as possible. Physical control over the source of corruption provides the best assurance that 
agreements can be enforced. We might thus expect contracts to go to areas controlled by the 
principals in a corruption racket. The process of reaching agreement, allocating spigots and 
arbitrating disputes may lead to uneconomic delays. The various partners in a corruption ra-
cket presumably do not trust each other a whole lot and might require lengthy discussion and 
review to come to a shared view.  
Grand corruption requires large amounts of money to be diverted. To keep the number of par-
ties involved limited both for reasons of enrichment by the principals and to keep the chances 
of whistleblowing down, it may be useful to go for large projects when feasible. It may be a 
bit like the choice of beverages in places where alcohol is officially prohibited. One then 
tends to find a disproportionate share of drinks with very high alcohol content – more bang 
for the buck per unit of smuggled merchandise. Also, by choosing large, complex contracts to 
let, the use of non-standard procurement methods becomes prima facie reasonable and cost 
comparisons are rendered difficult (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).  
What types of activities lend themselves to grand corruption? It is sometimes argued that it is 
monopoly businesses where lots of rents can be extracted. However, it is not clear that this is 
the main mechanism. Extracting rents means monitoring profit and loss statements and char-
ging profit-maximizing prices. The very information contained in comprehensive accounts 
that allow this to be done, makes it more likely that corrupt practices will be found out. High 
profits or high prices are very visible signs that attract attention of critics. For example, it is 
standard to argue in textbooks on infrastructure regulation that rate-of-return regulation is less 
likely to be considered illegitimate, because it seems to be better at rent extraction for the con-
sumer than price cap regulation, which may lead to observable high ex-post profit, even when 
all-in costs and prices may be lower. In reality, effective prices are typically too low in cor-
rupt countries – below full cost and often even below operating costs. Grand corruption often 
seems to go together with stealing from government funding of large projects and substandard 
service rather than high consumer prices and corporate profits.  
Low prices conveniently provide a “developmental narrative” that surrounds projects. Such 
narratives are a part of corrupt strategies. The narrative remains popular even though many 
studies suggest that the distributional effects of low prices tend actually to favor better-off 
people.  Low  prices  also  mean  that  funding  has  to  come  from  government  sources.  If  an 
infrastructure venture were dependent in full on payment by customers and funded by private 
debt markets, reasonably solid accounts would need to be maintained, which would increase   Enrichment with Growth 
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the likelihood of finding out wrong-doing
6. Corrupt payments may thus more easily be taken 
out of public funding, not privately paid revenues.  
Monitoring and accounting 
The discussion suggests that basic accounting is an enemy of corruption. It also highlights 
that a measure like profit exerts relatively tight management discipline, because, to be deri-
ved, it requires consistent and comprehensive accounting. Nigeria provides apposite anecdo-
tes. In 1978 a scandal broke for the national oil company, NNPC, facing allegations that it had 
diverted something in the order of 2.8 billion dollars. The allegations were never proven, not 
least thanks to the inexistence of accounts for the company. A public commission that dealt 
with the matter recommended in 1980 among other things that NNPC keep proper accounts. 
Consultants were hired. Yet, accounts kept being late by more than a year – unsuitable for 
management. In the mid-1980s a fire broke out in the accounting department and set the effort 
back further. The breaking out of fires, not in the kitchen, but in the accounting department 
had a good tradition in the country. West Africa’s then tallest tower, the NITEL building in 
Lagos, stood charred for many years from a fire that had broken out in its accounting depart-
ment.  
A lack of accounts prevents serious management and the lack of control is acutely felt by ma-
nagement. A colleague and I once developed a financial model of the Nigerian National Pet-
roleum Corporation (NNPC) based on public data on oil production, global oil prices, stan-
dard cost estimates and cost patterns from outdated accounts of the company. The then Mana-
ging Director of NNPC was so interested that he spent four hours discussing the financial 
model. In no other case was a person at this level willing to spend that much time discussing 
substantive issues without even a hint of a deal on the table.  
While comprehensive accounts are problematic for corrupt practices, some form of monito-
ring is needed on whether bribers paid and whether bribes received their agreed share. When 
IMF staffers once probed the fiscal accounts of Nigeria they could not reconcile numbers. 
When pressing for explanations, they were - allegedly - in the end able to see an accounting of 
major expenditures maintained at the very center of government in an exercise book. While 
this is no way to keep professional accounts, it might be a rational method for keeping track 
of corrupt payments. Such informal accounting  need not be as  comprehensive as full ac-
counts, but just needs to track critical payments. It need just be used for monitoring of corrupt 
agreements not for managing a company or government finances.  
A country case: Nigeria 
What might be the overall outcome of a system that embodies the features discussed above for 
a whole country? Consider Nigeria. One can easily document a few striking patterns.  
First, policy-making for large projects has been extremely stable – no external shock, no shift 
in relative prices used to dislodge or reshape projects, once they were agreed. Until recently, 
almost all large projects were already contained as proposals in a consultant report by Arthur 
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D. Little in 1964. They progressed inexorably, albeit excruciatingly slowly at times. The pos-
ter child for the syndrome is the multi-billion dollar Ajaokuta steel plant: conceived in 1964, 
started in 1979 with outdated Soviet technology, completed in 2004, shut down again and re-
opened in 2010. Official commission reports occasionally recommended that several projects 
be stopped, including Ajoakuta – with no effect
7. The slow progress may reflect periodic 
shortage of funds, shift in parts of the economics and also hold-ups by important players in 
the system. The Bonny LNG project provides a case in point. In 1964 a plane with buyers 
willing to sign off-take agreements for the gas was on the tarmac in Amsterdam ready to fly to 
Lagos. Yet, the then petroleum commissioner from the North of the country stopped the pro-
cess and ordered a review, during which time North Sea oil was discovered. This killed the 
economics of the project for many years. It was not until 1999 that the plant became operatio-
nal. The development of large infrastructure projects followed similar patterns. For example, 
hydro-power plants continued on course, even though gas would have been cheaper (Klein, 
1987). 
Second, the key players in the system have remained in important positions for very long pe-
riods of time. To this day candidates for top political positions are old-timers, such as Mu-
hammadu Buhari, author of the 1983 military coup, running for President in 2011
8. George 
Obiozor of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs once called Nigerian politics “a ga-
me of rocking chairs, a game in which unlike in the game of musical chairs, there is no mo-
vement”.
9 This is at odds with a country often depicted as rocked by coups and erratic politi-
cal change. Yet, it may be that elites at the top rotate, while the underlying power structure 
remains little changed.  
Third, large, complex projects were distributed across the major parts of the country, for e-
xample, one refinery in the East at Port Harcourt, one in the West at Warri and finally one in 
the North at Kaduna, some 800 km from the nearest port. Roughly this corresponds to the 
territories of the three main ethnic groups of the country, the Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo. Early 
on in 1962 the approach was to provide different regions of the country with equity shares in 
refineries in economically efficient locations. However, this proved not to be a stable solution 
politically. The results were bizarre projects. The Kaduna refinery was designed to produce 
specialty products that others did not produce, including asphalt for road construction. The 
refinery was built. Then the country had to import heavy oil to obtain the desired product slate 
via roughly 800 km of oil pipelines. When asphalt was finally produced the government ran 
out of money following the decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s. The response was to try 
exporting asphalt by rail back to the port ostensibly to obtain valuable foreign exchange. It 
was like buying a house knocking it down and selling the parts. 
Fourth, as the system is focused on extracting rents from funding of complex construction 
projects and undermines management capabilities and incentives, it may easily lead to provi-
sion of poor quality services. Whereas proper accounting allows one comprehensively to “fol-
low the money”, the causes of substandard quality are harder to pin down. For example, offi-
cials in Nigeria almost reflexively blame suppliers for sub-standard quality of equipment or 
construction regardless of the real reason. They might be right, they might not be. One cannot 
                                                 
7 For example, the Onosode Commission of 1984 
8 For a series of examples see Klein (1987) 
9 Newswatch October 6, 1983 p.25   Enrichment with Growth 
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easily find out. Funds for maintenance are lacking. Operations by local staff in government 
firms have often been deficient. The country is full of private fallback solutions for deficient 
infrastructure services like standby generation or private water vendors. 
Finally, the various arrangements that make corruption manageable provide a rational expla-
nation for often observed uneconomic decision-making, weak “capacity” and the like. Re-
views of Nigerian policies by the country itself have routinely come out with views that “prio-
rities are not properly defined, planning seems to be synonymous with aggregation of pro-
jects, and coordination by government departments is poor”. This particular assessment was 
made for NNPC by a managing director. Hence, top managers understand the issues. At the 
same time Nigerian staff performs effectively in different settings, for example, in the private 
oil companies in the country. Key managers of NNPC were in fact drawn from the private oil 
companies. Yet, capable and rational people have a hard time operating effectively in a sys-
tem that militates against sound management information, that tries to limit people in the 
know, compartmentalizes information and may promote staff into key position who are loyal 
and not so competent
10.  
As a result, possibly of a corruption driven syndrome, project choices have been uneconomic, 
massive delays abound, operations have been inefficient and service quality has been sub-
standard. Critical inputs for the economy as a whole were either not provided at all or in sub-
standard quality. Funds syphoned off have been of significant amounts and presumably been 
spent abroad to an important extent.  
 
Improving the Corrupt Business Model 
Running a traditional corruption system is possible but it undermines economic growth. Bad 
projects are chosen. Quality of service is reduced. Sound management is undermined. To up 
the game, new forms of enrichment are needed. Many powerful people dream of making their 
country richer, more “competitive”. They send their children to be educated at Harvard. They 
seek medical treatment in Singapore. They know that, if there was higher productivity growth 
in their economy, there could be so much more wealth going around, including for themsel-
ves.  
The basic challenges in establishing an effective system of corruption remain. Partnerships 
have to be formed. Agreements have to be monitored and enforced, all this without the expli-
cit help of official institutions and with at least plausible deniability. The challenges do not 
become easier if one seeks a more efficient system. Better project choices are needed as is 
better management. It means monitoring will be easier and secrecy harder to maintain. Yet, 
corrupt elites the world over are ready to embrace the challenge. 
                                                 
10 Intriguingly, the counterparts of one of the authors in the procurement process for a large gas pipeline seemed 
genuinely proud at the end of the somewhat tortuous process for having been part of at least a relatively clean 
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So what would the strategy of powerful people look like, if they wanted to combine enrich-
ment with better growth? Somehow they need to be directly interested in generating growth. 
This requires waiting until efficient projects produce profit derived from productivity growth. 
It means preventing others from breaking ranks and from stealing upfront in ways that un-
dermine the achievement of productivity growth. Andrew Wedeman (1997) has called this the 
search for “dividend-collecting” systems of corruption.  
Ownership of corporations 
One thing about economic growth seems clear. One needs to have dynamic firms with profes-
sional management. Compared to the previous discussion of a corrupt business model, the 
corrupt need to surround themselves not just with people who are loyal, but also competent 
and thus with outside options. Professional managers may jump ship when they see dubious 
behavior or they have the potential to apply their competence to feather their own nest to the 
detriment of the corrupt “principal”. This places a special burden on supervision of the profes-
sional by parties loyal to the principal, for example by family members of the principal. The 
number  of  suitable  family  members  or  otherwise  close  associates  limits  the  manageable 
control span and thus the size of firms. Supervision might also fail, because the supervisor 
might not be able to understand enough of what managers are actually doing. Hence it beco-
mes particularly important to obtain and keep incriminating evidence on them. Infractions like 
tax evasion, evasion of regulatory requirements or other personal dirt come in helpful to build 
an incriminating dossier.  
The challenges of hiding corrupt activities become more “market-oriented”. At one level they 
become easier. Once a corrupt principal has gained ownership of a firm, he has a legal right to 
derive benefits from it. Much effort thus goes into acquiring or disposing of assets by manipu-
lating valuation. For example, the acquisition of ownership rights and the purchase or sale of 
other assets is preferably conducted through negotiation rather than some form of effective 
auction. This provides  one explanation for the popularity among politicians of negotiated 
deals for privatization or, for example, large infrastructure contracts such as Independent Po-
wer Providers. Disguising beneficial ownership can help obscure the matter further. Other 
such time-honored ways of bad corporate governance can also be used for stealing such as 
using related party transactions for “tunneling”.  
Trying ones hand at owning corporations has become very popular for important political 
leaders in many countries. It has been tried with varying success by leaders across the world. 
Control of business empires is often exercised by family members, who might provide a de-
gree of loyalty. Elsewhere the ruling party may play that role. Famous examples are Suharto 
or the King of Morocco. Businesses in Indonesia with connections to Suharto suffered syste-
matic share price losses in response to news of Suharto’s health (Fisman, 2001). In the transi-
tion to market economies, leaders in countries of the former Soviet Union or in China or cur-
rently in Africa promote the move to more market-oriented systems while obtaining owners-
hip rights in new fully or partly private companies.  
A bit of emphasis on firms and professional management has provided some promising re-
sults – compare Nigeria and Indonesia. Yet, the recent troubles in Tunisia exemplify some of 
the limits of the approach. Important enterprises in the country were controlled by the family   Enrichment with Growth 
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of the deposed ruler, Ben Ali. Tunisia did well economically relative to other countries in the 
region that do not benefit from oil. However, growth remained modest. While the country had 
improved its policies, the heavy hand of government remained palpable for all who wanted to 
do business, from street vendors to larger players attempting to enter markets.  
The essential limitation of the “corporate model of corruption” is its attitude to entry and exit. 
The ruling elite, once transformed into owners, likes keeping competition out (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993). For growth to be more dramatic and to be sustained, the forces of creative de-
struction need to be allowed to play. It is then not clear that firms owned by powerful people 
will survive and with them the rents they were meant to provide.  
Sharing in portfolios of firms  
It seems that it is not enough to invest in a firm and try the professional way. If one also needs 
to pursue competition, the Holy Grail for a greedy ruler would be to “invest” in a portfolio of 
companies in a dynamic economy. Still corrupt people need to obfuscate information and 
maintain discipline in the system.  
Assuming that a solution exists, what might some features look like ex post? It seems plausib-
le to expect that a country that found a successful “portfolio approach” to corruption does not 
possess significant natural resources. There would then not have been the easy option to steal 
resource rents. Instead, the only way of generating rents would have been via productivity 
growth. 
The core corrupt system itself might consist of a limited number of powerful players with 
restricted entry into the system. At the same time there needs to be a market that selects good 
performers from bad ones. The measurement of success in that market needs to be compart-
mentalized so as to make it hard to trace money flows.  
Imagine you create some large conglomerates and limit competition at home. Then tell them 
that favors depend on success in export markets. Such success tends to reflect productivity 
growth thus creating gains that can be distributed among the corrupt. Monitoring export suc-
cess can be done independent of keeping good accounts. Export numbers are partial indicators 
of financial performance, but de facto often correlated with success. They can also be cross-
checked relatively easily by looking at import numbers abroad.  
To maintain discipline the interplay between taxation, regulation and firms provides means 
for hostage taking. First, higher taxes or complex regulations may make it more tempting to 
avoid them and thus provide fodder for incriminating dossiers. At the same time compliant 
firms may easily be able to avoid trouble with the law and thus not be unduly hindered as long 
as they “behave”. Second, in return for taxes and favors authorities may provide firms with 
benefits - subsidies of some form. Alternatively, one could just extract the net difference bet-
ween taxes and favors on the one hand and subsidies on the other. However, asking for higher 
taxes with the option of paying some back in the form of subsidies is a way of taking “hosta-
ges” to enforce corrupt agreements. If one also controls the banks and allows numbered bank 
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These various features are what one used to observe ex post in Korea. The government ag-
gressively  promoted  the  Chaebols,  Korean  conglomerates,  under  Park  Chung-Hee  in  the 
1960s. Business associations helped manage state-business collaboration. Initially, the goal 
was a “self-reliant” import-substituting economy under state control. Control was exercise 
through the banking system via preferential terms for credit. Even when banks were formally 
private, managers were appointed by the government. The use of anonymous accounts in 
banks was allowed. Accounting in Chaebols allowed detailed money flows to be obscured. A 
critical later innovation by the Park regime was that favors were provided to the Chaebol, 
only if they performed in export markets and paid unofficial political contributions (You, 
2005). This set up a contest that provided incentives for the Chaebol to raise productivity 
(Stiglitz, 1996).  
“Cultivating good relationships with the President became a golden road for business expan-
sion” (You, 2005). The good relationships were punctuated by occasional prosecution of bu-
siness owners or politicians for tax evasion or corruption, with cases typically dropped later, 
possibly because the desired disciplinary effect had been achieved. In one case the owner of 
Samhak, one of the largest conglomerates in the late 1960s, supported the opposition candida-
te Kim Dae-Jung in the 1971 election. He was convicted of tax evasion and the conglomerate 
forced into bankruptcy.  
The outcome was spectacular economic growth and probably rising amounts of corruption in 
absolute terms till the early 1990s (based on data on actual corrupt payments culled from 
newspaper reports and trials – see You, 2005).  
One might thus potentially interpret Korean industrial policy not just as a clever technocratic 
response to market failure, but also as a device to allow corruption to function in a system that 
generates productivity growth. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) pointed out that the Korea case 
was a puzzle. Maybe the design of “industrial policy” holds the key to the answer. 
Yet, even the “Korean Model” has limitations. During the Asian crises of the late 1990s prob-
lems of corporate governance were prominently displayed. The structure of corporate arran-
gements placed minority shareholders at risk. Problematic financial practices such as excessi-
ve leverage came to haunt corporations. The large corporations were hard to understand and 
difficult to control and restructure. Close ties to politics may have exacerbated excessive risk-
taking in the hope of political support in case of trouble. Limited transparency has been a le-
gacy of the past. In addition, one of the macro-economic outcomes of exposing corporations 
to competition in export markets, while protecting them at home, is a dualistic structure of the 
economy – world class corporations honed in global competition live side by side with low-
productivity companies catering to a protected domestic market, just like in Japan. 
How to do better then? What would be needed is an approach that provides for participation 
of the elite in a well-diversified portfolio of corporations that are exposed to competition and 
governed in a professional manner. To prevent professional managers abusing their control 
over corporations, effective corporate governance would need to protect shareholders. All the 
while the ruling elite would ensure that there be a policy environment that enables business to 
function well. The destructive features of traditional corruption would need to be eliminated. 
The remuneration of the elite would need to come from profits of the portfolio of companies.   Enrichment with Growth 
 
 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
  15 
 
To be able to maintain control over the system, a level of state ownership of critical players in 
the system, such as critical holding companies, would be useful. State ownership provides 
extra discretion to elites to assign positions and rights to income from firms and to discipline 
those breaking rank. 
These requirements are met, for example, by Singapore. The economy is organized around 
large state companies that act as holding companies for a range of businesses. Temasek hol-
dings is renowned for its professional competence and invests in a global portfolio – the ulti-
mate portfolio for sustained enrichment. Former government ministers, top civil servants and 
their families benefit, holding well-paid positions in these companies. Government ministers 
are among the highest paid in the world. The prime minister earned US$ 2.9 million last year 
and awarded himself an 8 months’ bonus. Singapore has one of the best business environ-
ments in the world. Corruption has been tackled effectively. Corporate governance standards 
are high. At the same time income distribution in Singapore is among the more unequal in this 
world. 
 
Corruption and the End of History 
In the literature on corruption there is a debate about whether corruption (or lack thereof) 
drives  economic  growth  or  whether  the  level  of  economic  development  (or  lack  thereof) 
drives corruption. The arguments of this paper suggest that corruption can drag down econo-
mic performance significantly. The expectation of economic growth can, however, change the 
form that corruption takes. The corrupt have incentives to adopt growth-oriented policies. 
Indeed growth seems compatible with some forms of corruption and that sort of growth need 
not lead to lower absolute enrichment of elites.  In the process legal forms of enrichment 
supplant illegal ones. Yet, the distribution of positions of power remains a murky area.  
Switching  enrichment  regimes  requires  policy  shifts.  Policies  like  privatization  or  public-
private partnerships can be part of the transitions from one regime to another. So can industri-
al policy. In normal technocratic discourse, the respective proponents of privatization on the 
one hand and industrial policy on the other tend to be considered to lie on opposing sides of 
the ideological spectrum. From the perspective of elites in search of riches both recipes may 
come in handy.  
Making the switch to more “productive enrichment” regimes can be hard. For example, politi-
cal scientists have argued that land owners in the Philippines have prevented reforms that oc-
curred in countries with effective land reforms like Korea and Taiwan (You, 2005). Failure to 
switch regimes provides a possible reason why some countries get trapped at particular inco-
me levels, not just “poverty traps”, but also middle income traps for countries like Tunisia. 
This is a variant of the arguments used by Mancur Olson who argued that initially successful 
systems may ossify, when interest groups prevent further desirable regime change including 
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Ultimately, the debate is about “using positions of power to extract rent”. Sometimes this in-
volves illegal abuse of a public position for private gain, commonly called corruption. Some-
times this involves legal arrangements that happen to favor an elite
11.  
Wealth creation is enhanced when people are rewarded on merit and not by virtue of a positi-
on of power they may happen to hold. Yet, the interest in maintaining position may undermi-
ne wealth creation. The ultimate requirement for wealth creation is allocating positions of 
power based on merit. Some rulers like Deng Xiao Ping and Lee Kuan Yew saw the need to 
step back and promote at least a modicum of merit-based succession.  
In the end, less personal ways of arranging for succession may turn out to be more effective. 
Democratic elections are a way to do so. Just like competition in markets, elections allow for 
challenge from new promising ideas and for an end to failed approaches. The process itself 
helps create legitimacy. Things can still go wrong, but at least one no longer needs to rely on 
the wisdom of powerful rulers.  
Just recently, in several elections during 2011 Singaporeans sent an unexpectedly strong mes-
sage of distrust to the ruling party. Stellar economic performance has not been enough it 
seems. From the perspective of an advisor to the powerful, Francis Fukuyama’s thesis of the 
“End of History” remains relevant. As long as different jurisdictions race each other in search 
for “competitiveness” or productivity growth, democracy may find some unexpected allies. 
Democracy not only provides citizens with greater freedom, but may ultimately also be the 










                                                 
11 I encountered an amusing, albeit damaging example in Greece a few years before the current financial crisis. 
The government of the day tried to reform business registration for small and medium firms. In most countries 
this type of reform is popular and relatively easy to implement – not in Greece. The complex Greek registrati-
on system required a series of steps with fees being paid for several. The fees went to fund the pension fund of 
lawyers in Greece. Hence change was impossible. In substance the difference between unofficial and illegal 
“fee schedules” for bribes may be small.   Enrichment with Growth 
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Concluding remarks 
First, this review of types of corruption suggests that a variety of weird forms of behavior 
observed in struggling economies may in fact be perfectly rational ways to behave for the 
elites seeking enrichment. By the same token an apparent “lack of capacity” may be a part of 
rational strategy for the corrupt. 
Second, corruption can be detrimental for economic welfare. Yet, different types of enrich-
ment systems exist. Some allow elites to do very well by lifting all boats.  
Third, it is not just that different systems of corruption exist. The argument of this essay sug-
gests that the very experience of rapid, historically unprecedented growth is motivating elites 
to seek new ways of enrichment that can actually lead to a better life for all. Call it economic 
revolution from above.  
Fourth, ultimately the highest degree of wealth may be reached when people obtain their posi-
tion in society on the basis of merit. Choosing elites well is part of the issue. The search for 
enrichment is one part of the forces driving towards elections of rulers. 
Fifth, once upon a time, when elites had accepted rights to the spoils of the land, enrichment 
was not “abuse” in a legal sense. The emergence of less personal systems of rule subject to 
the rule of law “forced” rapacious elites to resort to corruption, the abuse of position for per-
sonal gain. The forms of enrichment that seem most effective today again allow the elites to 
obtain their wealth legally, even though the acquisition, for example, of property rights may 
have occurred illegitimately. Proudhon’s dictum that “property is theft” might apply in such 
cases. 
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